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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 20608

ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal
A*

Did the Court's decision to try the case in the

Defendant's absence deny Defendant his constitutional right to be
present at trial.
B.

Were Defendant's conviction and sentence a denial

of his right to the equal protection of the laws.
C.

Was there sufficient evidence as a matter of law to

find the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time
of the accident.

Statement of the Nature of the Case
The Defendant-Appellant,
from

a conviction

and

judgment

ROBERT
of

GLEN

HOUTZ, appeals

two counts of Automobile

Homicide, a felony of the third degree, two counts of Driving
while under the Influence of Alcohol and Inflicting Bodily Injury
to Another, a Class A Misdemeanor and one count each of Leaving
-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Scene of Accident involving Death and Injury to Persons, a
Class A Misdemeanor, Leaving Scene of Accident Involving Damage
to

Property,

a

Class

B

Misdemeanor

and

Failure

to

Report

Accident, a Class B Misdemeanor, in the Fifth Judicial District
Court in and for Beaver County, State of Utah, the Honorable J.
Harlan Burns, presiding.

Disposition of the Lower Court
The Defendant-Appellant, ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ, was charged
with two counts (Counts 1 & 2 of the Information) of Automobile
Homicide, a Felony of the Third Degree, in violation of Section
76-5-207, Utah

Code

Annotated,

1953, as amended, two counts

(Counts 3 & 4 of the Information) of Driving while under the
Influence of Alcohol and Inflicting Bodily Injury to Another, a
Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-6-44, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, and one count each of

(Count 5)

Leaving

Injury to

the Scene of Accident involving Death and

Persons, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-6-29,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, (Count 6) Leaving Scene of
Accident Involving Damage to Property, a Class B Misdemeanor in
violation of Section
amended

and

Misdemeanor,

41-6-30, Utah

Code Annotated,

1953, as

(Count 7) Failure to Report Accident, a Class B
in

violation

Annotated, 1953, as amended.

of

Section

41-6-34,

Utah

Code

The Defendant was convicted of all

counts as charged in a jury trial held without the presence of
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Defendant and was sentenced to incarceration at the Utah
State Prison for an indeterminate term of not to exceed five
years and a fine in the amount of $5,000,00 on Count 1, an
indeterminate

term of not to exceed

consecutively

on

Count

five year to be

served

2, a term of 364 days to be served

consecutively on Count 3, a term of 364 days on Count 4, to be
served concurrently with the term imposed on Count 3, a term of
364 days on Count 5, to be served concurrently with the term
imposed on Count 3 and no additional term of imprisonment on
Counts 6 and 7 since they are deemed merged into the offense
committed in Count 5 of the Information,

Relief Sought on Appeal
Defendant-Appellant

seeks reversal of the conviction

and judgment rendered below and reversal of the lower court's
denial of Defendant-Appellant's Motion to Dismiss, dismissal of
the information or in the alternative to have the case remanded
to the Fifth Judicial Court for a new trial.

Statement of Facts
On

August

12, 1984, DONALD

GRONDEL, NONA

GRONDEL,

SHIRLEY ANN GRONDEL and DEREK GRONDEL were travelling north on

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1-15 in a small four door Datsun. (T. 34, 35, 36)

Sometime

between 6:00 and 9:00 p.m. (T. 44) or just before twilight or
dark (T. 67) , the GRONDEL vehicle was merging onto Highway 1-15
from a rest stop. (T. 37)

1-15 at that point had two lanes of

traffic going each way. (T. 37)

Just as the GRONDEL vehicle was

merging onto the right lane of 1-15, a white truck (T. 39), or a
brown or bronze colored truck (T. 55) , travelling at a high rate
of speed (T. 59), struck the GRONDEL vehicle from behind. (T. 40,
62)

The GRONDEL vehicle rolled over ejecting all four passengers

(T. 41) , and the truck continued up the road. (T. 62)

The point

of the accident was seventeen miles north of Beaver on 1-15. (T.
155)
Floyd Vaughn from Honolulu, Hawaii testified that he
witnessed

the accident

(T. 54, 55), that

he

had

seen what

appeared to be the same truck about one-half hour before the
accident (T. 56) , that at that time the vehicle was travelling
about seventy to eighty miles per hour when it passed Vaughn's
vehicle (T. 57) , and that the truck ran off the side of the road
on the passing lane and then cut in front of Vaughn's vehicle.
(T. 57)
Later

a

few

minutes

observed the same truck coming up.

before

the

accident, Vaughn

At that time Vaughn observed

References to the trial transcript of February 27, 28,
1985 will be designated "T". References to the February 26, 1985
hearing will be designated "T " .
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the same shirtless male with light-colored hair as being the
occupant of the truck. (T. 60)

After passing the van, Vaughn

observed:
. . . he was going fast and he kinda from —
he almost ran off the road on the — in his
own lane side, which is the median like between
the roads." (T. 60) I saw him run off one side
of the road, then the other at a high speed.
(T. 61)
When the truck came to the GRONDEL vehicle it was on
the right hand lane and ". . .it looked like he was pulling in to
pass, only he just slammed into that car."

(T. 62)

Vaughn stayed at the scene five minutes then drove up
the road to call for an ambulance and the highway patrol. (T. 66)
As Vaughn continued along 1-15 he saw the same truck
pulled over by the side of the road. (T. 69)

He stopped, wrote

down the California license plate number, saw the same person he
had seen driving the truck before, asleep in the vehicle. (T. 70)
Vaughn noticed the odor of what he assumed to be alcohol. (T. 75)
He called the Utah Highway Patrol. (T. 72)
State Trooper Brent Shelby testified he had been given
a license plate number and description of a vehicle from the Orem
Highway Patrol dispatcher (T. 84), the description being a bronze
GMC or Chevrolet pickup with a damaged right front and California
License No. 1W01049. (T. 85, 86)
Trooper

Shelby

located

a

vehicle

matching

the

description in Juab County a couple of miles north of the Yuba
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Lake Interchange northbound just to the side of 1-15 (T. 86) , at
approximately 10:50 p.m. on August 12, 1984. (T. 96, 98)

A male

adult in his latter forties or early fifties, grayed white hair,
six feet tall, 175 - 185 pounds, was observed
vehicle

asleep

in the

(T. 17), identified by California Driverfs License as

ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ. (T. 89)
MR. HOUTZ was awakened and informed he was under arrest
for DUI and suspicion of automobile homocide.

He was taken to a

hospital and a blood sample was taken at 11:36 p.m. (T. 96, 98)
The blood sample tested at .27 weight per volume percent. (T.134)
Trial was scheduled for February 25, 19 85 and notice
was given to Defendant's counsel. (T. 13)

The Court was advised

by counsel for Defendant that the Defendant intended to waive the
jury and try the case before the judge. (T2.3)

Since the Court

had a jury already summoned for February 25, 1985, the Court
scheduled another jury trial on February 25, 1985 and informed
counsel that non-jury trial would begin on February 26, 1985.
(T. 22)

The Defendant did not appear at trial on February 26,

1985 because he was in custody in San Diego, California on a
charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. (T. 13)

MR.

HOUTZ was arrested on the DUI charge in San Diego on February 25,
1985. (T. 13)
The Defendant's counsel moved the Court to continue the
trial until HOUTZ could be present but the Court denied the
motion. (T. 24)

The jury trial took place on February 27th and
-6-
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28th, 1985.

The jury

returned a verdict of guilty on all counts

charged in the Information.

The Defendant waived extradition on

March 1, 1985 and returned to Beaver County just a few days after
trial.

The Defendant appeared for sentencing on March 18, 1985.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
(1)
present

at

The Defendant

trial

but

has a constitutional

that right can be waived

words, such as where the Defendant voluntarily
from trial.

right to be

by conduct
absents

or

himself

Generally, a person in custody is not a free agent

and therefore cannot voluntarily waive his right to be present at
trial.

The burden is on the State to show voluntariness on the

part of the Defendant who absents himself from trial.
The Defendant, ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ, did not
trial

because

he

was

incarcerated

in

jail

California prior to the date set for trial.

in

appear

San

at

Diego,

The State made no

effort to determine if the Defendant would waive extradition and
how quickly he could be brought to Utah, even though the State
was aware

that the Defendant

was

in jail.

In actuality, the

Defendant did waive extradition and was brought to Beaver County
very quickly.

The State failed to meet their burden of showing

voluntariness

and

the

Court

should

have

granted

Defendant's

Motion to Continue the Trial until Defendant could be present.
(2)
treatment

of

Equal
all

protection

those

who

are

of

the

laws

similarly

guarantees

situated
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and

like
our

criminal justice system contemplates a series of graded offenses,
that depend upon increasingly culpable mental states.

The recent

decision of State v. Bryan, No. 18948 (Utah, June 6, 1985), where
the

court

reversed

Defendant's

sentence

on

a

manslaughter

conviction and ordered the lesser punishment provided under the
negligent homicide statute in the motor vehicle code because both
statutes specified the same "reckless" conduct, has created a
situation where this Defendant, ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ, has not been
treated equally.
Either Mr. HOUTZ received a more severe punishment than
the Defendant in Bryan, for identical "reckless" conduct because
the prosecutor chose to file automobile homicide charges rather
than manslaughter charges or in the alternative, the Defendant's
conduct was less culpable than the Defendant's conduct in Bryan
(negligent rather than reckless conduct) and this Defendant is
being unfairly punished more severely
Bryan.

than

the

Defendant

in

Therefore, the Defendant's sentence should be reversed

and the lesser punishment provided in Bryan, should be awarded
HOUTZ.
(3)

The State provided no direct evidence that the

Defendant, ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ, was under the influence of alcohol
at the time of the accident, only circumstantial evidence that
the Defendant was speeding and going from side to side on the
road.

That

driving

pattern

could

have

circumstances that are not alcohol related.

been

caused

by

Results of a blood
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alcohol test taken approximately two and one-half hours after the
alleged driving should not have been admitted in accordance with
the rules of evidence.
The Defendant was discovered about two hours after the
accident approximately eighty (80) miles away from the accident
scene.

The State did not present any evidence that excluded the

possibility

that

the Defendant could have become

after the accident.
this

possibility

intoxicated

Since the State had the burden of excluding

and

failed, Counts

1,

2, 3 and

4 of the

Information should have been dismissed or alternatively Counts 1
and 2 reduced to Negligent Homicide.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT TRIAL.
The right to be present at trial is guaranteed by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States and by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
This right has been codified in Section 77-1-6 (1) (a) (d) Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended and Section 77-35-17(a)(2) Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended.
In State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 P.2d

1052, 1055

(1935) , the Court stated the applicable law with regard to the
right to be present at trial:
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The right to be present at all stages of the
trial is claimed to be of such an absolute
character that it cannot be waived either by
counsel or the Defendant, and when the Court
permits the trial to proceed in the absence
of the Defendant the judgment of conviction
must be set aside. There is no doubt but
that the constitutional right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel is a sacred
right of one accused of crime which may not
be infringed or frittered away, and is one
which may not be denied by a Court or be
waived by counsel.
Concerning whether the right to be present at trial can be waived
by a Defendant, the Court said:
Whether such right may be waived by the Defendant
personally is a question on which the authorities
are divided. . . The great weight of authority is
that the Defendant may, by conduct or in words,
waive such right, and that he may not take
advantage of his voluntary absence, if he is at
liberty on bail during some part of the proceedings
at which it is his duty as well as his right to be
in attendance. (Id at 1055)
However, when the Defendant is in custody, the Court must see
that he is present for trial:
Where Defendant is in custody, and therefore
not a free agent, the duty is on the Court to
see that he is personally present at every
stage of the trial . . . His absence would be
imputed, not to him, but to his custodian. . .
Proceedings had in the absence of the Defendant
without his fault and without his knowledge or
consent, is ground for reversal. (Id at 1056)
In State v. Okamura, 570 P.2d 848 (1977), the Hawaii
Supreme Court held that the burden rests on the prosecution to
show voluntariness on the part of one who absents himself from
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trial.

With regard to whether a Defendant in custody can waive

his right to be present at trial, the Court said:
It is true that a Defendant not in custody may
consent to a waiver of his right to be present
at trial. . . but it is doubtful in a felony
case that he has the power to do so when he is
being held in custody. (Evans v. United States,
284 F.2d 393, 395 (6th Cir. 1960) Id at 852
The Supreme Court of the

State

of

Utah

apparently

agrees with the Hawaii Supreme Court that the burden is on the
State to show voluntariness on the part of the Defendant who
absents himself from trial.

In State v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641, 642

(1982), the Utah Supreme Court said:
Counsel for Defendant, on appeal, urges that the
onus is on the State to show voluntariness of
absence and lack of consent to a trial in
absentia to satisfy one's constitutional right
to "due process.11 No one denies the general
principal involved, but if the State failed in any
respect in its obligation to establish voluntariness,
or waiver of consent, the Defendant supplied any
such void by his own actions which prevented his
attendance at trial. (Id underlining added)
In

State

v.

Ross,

(supra), the trial had actually

commenced with the Defendant present but after several days the
trial was continued because of the Defendant's medical problems.

'

Defendant, who was released on bail during this continuance,
absconded and was arrested on other charges in Nebraska.

He was

released on bail and could have returned immediately to Utah,

{

with Nebraska's consent, to continue the trial, but the Defendant
refused to return and even fought an extradition warrant.

The
i
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Court held that the Defendant's voluntary actions were sufficient
to establish voluntariness or waiver of consent.
In the present case, written notice of trial was sent
to Defendant's counsel, setting trial for on the 25th day of
February, 1985. (T. 21)

The Court, based on information that the

Defendant intended to waive the jury, rescheduled the matter for
February
(T. 22)

26, 1985

upon

oral

notice

to

Defendant's

counsel.

Defendant's counsel contacted Defendant and told him the

trial would start Tuesday, the 26th. (T. 14)

The State became

aware that the Defendant was in jail in California in San Diego
on the 26th of February. (T. 13)

The Court had continued the

trial date until February 27th (T2. 8 ) , and the trial lasted two
days.

(T. 1)

Nowhere

in the record did

the State make any

attempt to contact Mr. Houtz or to determine if he would be
willing to waive extradition and how quickly he could be brought
to Utah.

In actuality, Mr. Houtz did waive extradition and was

immediately brought to Beaver County and appeared for sentencing
on March 18, 1985.

(See Judgment and Sentence and Commitment)

In State v. Ross, supra, the fact that the State made
the effort to try to extradite the Defendant in order to conclude
his trial and that the Defendant refused to waive extradition
seemed to carry at lot of weight in the Court's decision that the
Defendant voluntarily absented himself or waived his right to be
present.
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In the present case, the State made no effort at all to
contact the Defendant, while he was in custody, to determine if
he could be brought back to stand trial.

Since the Defendant was

arrested before he was to appear for trial, he was in custody and
unable to voluntarily waive his right to be present at trial.
The State's failure to make any effort to bring Defendant back
from San Diego for trial seems to be prima facie evidence that
they failed to meet their burden of showing voluntariness on the
part of Defendant.
The

lower

Court's

refusal

to

continue

the

trial

resulted in a denial of MR. HOUTZ Constitutional right to be
present at trial.

The fact that the lower Court did proceed

without the presence of the Defendant requires a reversal of the
judgment of conviction and this Court should remand the case to
the District Court for a new trial.

POINT II.
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE OF TWO CONSECUTIVE ZERO TO FIVE YEAR TERMS
FOR HIS CONVICTION ON TWO AUTOMOBILE HOMOCIDE COUNTS WAS A DENIAL
OF HIS EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

recently

explained

the

Court's responsibility to insure the evenhanded application of
the criminal laws.
. . . Nevertheless, we cannot disregard our
responsibility to assure the rational and
evenhanded application of the criminal laws.
Equal protection of the law guarantees like
treatment of all those who are similarly situated.
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Accordingly, the criminal laws must be written
so that there are significant differences between
offenses and so that the exact same conduct is
not subject to different penalties depending
under which of two statutory sections a prosecutor
chooses to charge. That would be a form of
arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of
law. . .State v. Bryan, No. 18948 (Utah, June 6, 1985)
With regard to specific statutes this Court has said:
Statutes which treat classes of citizens
differently do not offend equal protection
guarantees unless the classification and
different treatment bear no rational relationship
to the objective of the legislation.
(Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 1982).
Statutes may deal with different classes
differently, if all within the same class are
treated uniformly, and so long as there is
some reasonable basis for differentiation
between classes related to the purpose of the
statute. (State v. Piepenburg, 602 P.2d 702
(Utah 1979)
In

State

v.

Bryan, supra

at

6, the Supreme Court

explained that if an intoxicated driver negligently causes the
death of another, he can be found guilty of automobile homocide,
a

third

degree

felony,

but

if

an

intoxicated

driver

acts

"recklessly" he can be found guilty of manslaughter, a second
degree felony.

The Court said:

Our justice system contemplates a series of
graded offenses, that depend upon increasingly
culpable mental states. If the State can prove
that a defendant acted with the more culpable
mental state, the defendant can be convicted
of the higher offense.
However,

the

Court,

in

Bryan,

Defendant's sentence on a manslaughter

supra,

reversed

conviction because the
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definition of "recklessness" under the manslaughter

statute and

"reckless disregard of the safety of others", as defined in the
negligent

homocide

determined

to

be

statute
the

in

same.

the
The

Motor
Court

Vehicle
then

Code

determined

were
the

Defendant was entitled to the lesser punishment provided under
the negligent homocide statute in the Motor Vehicle Code,
Now, due to the decision in Bryany supra, and until the
legislature

can consider

this problem, there

is no longer a

series of graded offenses as contemplated by the legislature and
the

classification

drivers

who

cause

and
the

different
death

of

treatment
others

given
bears

intoxicated
no

rational

relationship to the objective of the legislature.

There is no

reasonable basis for the differentiation between

reckless and

negligent conduct of intoxicated drivers.

The current statutes

and court rulings provide the person guilty of the more culpable
conduct with a lesser sentence.
In Bryan, supra, the evidence

established

that

the

Defendant had been drinking heavily and had been driving at a
high rate of speed while driving through red semifor lights on
heavily travelled roads.
In the present case, the prosecution claims that the
Defendant was heavily intoxicated and was driving at an extremely
high rate of speed.

The prosecutor chose to charge the Defendant

with two counts of automobile homocide rather than attempt to
gain a conviction

for

two

counts

of

manslaughter.

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Had

the

prosecutor charged and obtained a conviction on manslaughter, the
Defendant would have been entitled

to be punished under the

misdemeanor statute of negligent homocide under the Motor Vehicle
Code.
Alternatively, if the conduct of the Defendant HOUTZ
was actually negligent and not reckless, then the Defendant's
conduct was less culpable than the Defendant's conduct in Bryan,
supra,

and

this

Defendant

is

being

unfairly

punished

more

severely than the Defendant in Bryan, supra.
In order to provide the Defendant, HOUTZ, with equal
protection

of

the

laws

Defendant

should

be

entitled

to

be

sentenced under the misdemeanor provisions.
Therefore, Defendant requests that this Court reverse
his sentencing under the felony provisions of the automobile
homocide statute and remand the case to the District Court to be
sentenced as a misdemeanor.

POINT III.
AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT DEFENDANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AT THE TIME OF
THE ACCIDENT.
The trial transcript does not reveal an exact time of
the accident.

Mr. Conrad Grimshaw testified that he received a

call to respond to the accident at 9:30 p.m. on August 12, 1984.
(T. 49)

Mr. Grimshaw testified that he was the second ambulance

and that he thought the first ambulance was enroute about 9:15
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p.m. and probably received a call approximately 9:10 to 9:12 p.m.
(T. 51)
testified

SHIRLEY ANN GRONDEL, one of the victims in this matter,
that she did

not

remember

what

time

the

accident

happened other than sometime between 6:00 and 9:00 p.m. (T. 44)
Mr. Floyd Vaughn testified

that

he

stopped

for

around

five

minutes to give aid and then he drove for a long time until he
could call in and report the accident. (T. 66)

He testified that

"the time of the accident was just before twilight or dusk.
There was no need for light but it was right at the end of the
day." (T. 67)

The amount of time it took Mr. Vaughn to stop and

give aid and then drive to a phone is probably about the amount
of

time

before

9:10

p.m.

when

the

accident

happened.

The

accident took place approximately 16 or 17 miles north of Beaver.
(T. 155)
MR. HOUTZ was found parked to the side of 1-15 just
North of the Yuba Lake Interchange approximately 15 to 18 miles
south of Levan. (T. 86)

The Court can take judicial notice of

the distance between the accident scene

(16-17 miles north of

Beaver on 1-15) and where the Houtz vehicle was located
north

of

the

Yuba

Lake

Interchange

appears to be around eighty miles.

on 1-15) .

(just

The distance

MR. HOUTZ was approached by

the officers at approximately 10:50 p.m. (T. 96), and a blood
alcohol test was drawn at the hospital at 11:36 p.m. (T. 98)
The only evidence of intoxication presented at the time
of the accident was the testimony of Floyd Vaughn.
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Mr. Vaughn

did not provide any direct evidence of intoxication at the time
of

the

ability.

accident

but

he

did

observe

the Defendant's driving

Mr, Vaughn testified that he witnessed the accident (T.

54, 55) , that he had seen what appeared to be the same truck
about one-half hour before the accident (T. 56) , that at that
time the vehicle was travelling about seventy to eighty miles per
hour when it passed Vaughn's vehicle (T. 57).
He went by fast. He was in the passing lane
and like ran off onto the berm on that side,
came back in and moved like all the way into
the front of us in our lane in one fast motion
so that Mr. Zadick had to brake to avoid, I
don't want to say a collision, but danger. (T. 57)
Later a few minutes before the accident Vaughn observed
the same truck coming up.
As he came up alongside our van, I had to get
over real fast because he almost like bumped
us side to side or we — he came over like
right next to me and I just looked directly
out my driver's side window and he was like —
the truck was partially in our lane right
exactly next to me. So I had to move over onto
the road shoulder and allow him to pass me. (T. 58)
At

that

time

Vaughn

observed

the

same

shirtless

male

with

light-colored hair as being the occupant of the truck. (T. 60)
After passing the van, Vaughn observed:
. . . he was going fast and he kinda from —
he almost ran off the road on the — in his
own lane side, which is the median like between
the roads ". (T. 60) I saw him run off one side
of the road, then the other at a high speed. (T.61)
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When the truck came to the GRONDEL vehicle it was on
the right hand lane and ". . .it looked like he was pulling in to
pass, only he just slammed into that car."
Other
attributed

to

than

this

sleepiness,

driving

(T. 62)

pattern,

recklessness,

which

negligence

could
or

be

other

conditions not caused by intoxication, no other evidence was
presented to show that the Defendant was under the influence of
alcohol at the time of the accident.

POINT A
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S BLOOD ALCOHOL LEVEL AND THE BURNOFF RATE
OF ALCOHOL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED.
The

Court, over the objection of Defendant's

trial

counsel, admitted the results of a blood alcohol test taken at
10:36

that

evening

and

evidence

of

the

burnoff

rate

or

dissipation rate of alcohol from the blood.
Section 41-6-44.5 Utah Code Annotated, as Amended, 1953
as it was written at the time of the accident is as follows:
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it
is material to prove that a person was
driving or in actual physical control of a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
or with a blood alcohol content statutorily
prohibited, the results of a chemical test or
tests as authorized in section 41-6-44.10
shall be admissible as evidence.
(2) If the chemical test was taken within
two hours of the alleged driving or actual
physical control, the blood alcohol level of
the person at the time of the alleged driving
or actual physical control shall be presumed
to be not less than the level of the alcohol
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determined to be in the blood by the chemical
test.
(3) If the chemical test was taken more than
two hours after the alleged driving or actual
physical control, the test result shall be
admissible as evidence of the person's blood
alcohol level at the time of the alleged
driving or actual physical control, but the
trier of fact shall determine what weight
shall be given to the result of the test.
(4) The foregoing provisions of this section
shall not prevent a court from receiving
otherwise
admissible
evidence
as
to
a
defendant's blood alcohol level at the time
of the alleged driving or actual physical
control.
Section

76-5-207, Utah

Code

Annotated,

as

1953, as it was in effect at the time of the accident:
76-5-207 (1) Criminal homicide constitutes
automobile homicide if the actor, while under
the
influence
of
alcohol,
a
controlled
substance, or any drug, to a degree which
renders the actor incapable of safely driving
a vehicle, causes the death of another by
operating a motor vehicle in a negligent
manner. For the purposes of this section, the
standard of negligence shall be that of
simple negligence, the failure to exercise
that
degree
of
care
which
ordinarily
reasonable and prudent persons exercise under
like or similar circumstances.
(2)
Any chemical test administered on a
defendant with his consent or after his
arrest under this section, whether with or
against his consent, shall be admissible in
accordance with the rules of evidence.
(3) For purposes of this section, a motor
vehicle
constitutes
any
self-propelled
vehicle and includes, but is not limited to,
any
automobile,
truck,
van, motorcycle,
train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft.
(4) Automobile homicide is a felony of the
third degree.
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amended,

Section 76-5-207 (2) provides that any chemical test is
admissible

according

to

the

rules

of

evidence.

Section

41-6-44.5 (3) allows the result of chemical tests administered
more than two hours after the alleged driving to be admitted but
the weight to be given such a test is to be determined by the
trier of fact.
In State v. Bradley, 578 P. 2d 1267

(1978) the Utah

Supreme Court, in a case decided before the current amendments to
the above statutes, allowed a test of Defendant's blood alcohol
content taken nearly four hours after the accident to be admitted
into

evidence

because

it

was

relevant

to

corroborate

the

testimony of the State's witness who observed the Defendant and
concluded he was under the influence of alcohol.
It is unclear whether Section 41-6-44.5 (3) applies to
Section

76-5-207

since

76-5-207

(2)

seems

to

clearly

and

precisely state the standard for admissibility of chemical tests.
Bradley, supra, appears to be consistent with the standard in
76-5-207
evidence.

(2) .

That is to base admissibility on the rules of

In the present case, there is no direct evidence of

intoxication

and

the

blood

alcohol

test

and

burnoff

rate

testimony are irrelevant and much to prejudicial to be allowed
into evidence.

Under the Rules

of

Evidence, that

should not have been allowed.
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testimony

POINT B
THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN OF EXCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE
DEFENDANT COULD HAVE BECOME INTOXICATED AFTER THE ACCIDENT.
"Mr. Burtis Quarnberg, as an expert witness for the
State, testified on cross-examination that it would take a little
over a pint of whiskey injested all at once to achieve a blood
alcohol level of .27. (T. 147,,128), and that it was possible for
a person to achieve a blood alcohol level of .27 in two and a
half hours. (T. 125,149)

Mr. Quarnberg felt is was unlikely but

not impossible. (T. 149)
The State failed to provide any evidence of drinking
alcohol prior to the accident and failed to prove Defendant had
no access to alcohol after the accident.
In State v. Clark, 296 A.2d 475 (Vermont, 1972), the
officers

came

upon

an

overturned

truck

Defendant who appeared to be intoxicated.
that he was the driver of the truck

and

discovered

the

The Defendant admitted
and

that

the

accident

happened because he had fallen asleep.
Entirely lacking in the presentation of the
State was any evidence, direct or circumstantial,
of the time when the Defendant had the accident...
"Intoxication may be evidenced circumstantially
by prior or subsequent condition within such
time that the condition may be supposed to be
continuous" 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence §235 (3d ed 1940)
"This accords with our rule that an inference may
be and often is retroactive; a trier may from
present conditions infer a previous fact" Ackerman v.
Kogut, 117 Vt. 40,44, 84 A.2d 131,134 (1951).
But it is obvious to have the inference of
being under the influence of intoxicating liquor
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applied retroactively in the present case that
the burden was upon the State of showing by
evidence that the accident caused by the
defendant occurred within a time that the
intoxicated condition, in which he was found at
the scene, had been continuous since the accident
time. This burden of proof was not met by the
State, and its chain of evidence was broken.
By the omission of this link in its chain
of evidence, the State failed to prove the
defendant guilty as charged beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In Brown v. State, 584 P.2d 231, (Oklahoma, 1978), the
Court held:
The evidence showing the defendant was
intoxicated when arrested at the scene of the
accident was insufficient to sustain a conviction
in the absence of evidence as to when the accident
occurred and of evidence excluding the possibility
that the defendant could have become intoxicated
after the accident but before the police arrived.
In the present case it is clear that at the time of the
accident the Defendant was speeding and that he was going from
one side of the road to the other.

However, in each instance,

this side to side motion occurred while passing a vehicle on the
two lane highway.

Whether this driving pattern was caused by

sleepiness, recklessness, negligence, or
shown by the evidence.

drunkennesss

is not

Following the accident the Defendant's

vehicle was not observed again for at least an hour and probably
closer to two hours later and approximately eighty miles away
from the accident scene.

The record does not show if Defendant

consumed alcohol after the accident but before his arrest.

At

trial, no one bothered to ask any witnesses if the Defendant had
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access to alcoholic beverages in his vehicle.

In Brown v. State,

supra at 234, the Court said:
The fact there was no testimony concerning
whether the defendants car contained liquor must
therefore inure to the benefit of the defendant.
Had the officers been able to testify positively
that they looked in the car and in the near vicinity,
and found no liquor or "empties," then that would
have been one more circumstance tending to indicate
that the defendant was intoxicated while driving.
At the conclusion of the State's case, defense counsel
moved to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 or alternatively to reduce them
to negligent homocide on the basis that the State did not show at
the time of the accident that the Defendant, ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ,
was intoxicated.

The Court should have granted this motion and

in addition, Counts 3 and 4 should also have been dismissed since
they also require evidence of intoxication at the time of the
alleged driving.

CONCLUSION
The lower Court's refusal to continue the trial until
MR. HOUTZ could be present resulted in a denial of MR. HOUTZ
constitutional right to be present at trial.

The fact that the

lower court did proceed without the presence of the Defendant
requires a reversal of the judgment of conviction and this Court
should remand the case to the District Court for a new trial.
In order to provide the Defendant, HOUTZ, with equal
protection

of

the

laws

Defendant

should

be

entitled
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to be

sentenced under the same misdemeanor provisions as the Defendant
in the Bryan, supra, case.

Therefore, Defendant requests that

this Court reverse his sentencing under the felony provisions of
the automobile homocide

statute

and

remand

the

case

to

the

District Court to be sentenced as a misdemeanor.
Plaintiff failed to prove that Defendant was under the
influence

of

alcohol

at

the

time

of

the

accident

and

consequently, the conviction and judgment should be reversed and
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Information dismissed or in the
alternative

Counts

1 and

2

should

be

reduced

to

negligent

homocide.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 21st day of October, 1985.

b&y&jf
LEO G. KANELL

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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I certify
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L. Wilkinson, Utah State Attorney

General, 236 State Capitol

Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 21st day of October,
1985.
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LEO G. KANELL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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A D D E N D U M

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON

76-5-301

76-5-207. Automobile homicide. (1) Criminal homicide constitutes automobile
homicide if the actor, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor alcohol, a
controlled substance, or any drug, to a degree which renders the actor incapable
of safely driving a vehicle, causes the death of another by operating a motor vehicle
in a negligent manner. For the purposes of this section, the standard of negligence
shall be that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which
ordinarily reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances.
(2) The presumption established by subsection 41 6-44(b), relating to Wood alcohol percentages, shall be applicable to thts section, ami a«y Any chemical test
administered on a defendant with his consent or after his arrest under this section,
whether with or against his consent, shall be admissible in accordance with the
rules of evidence.
(3) For purposes of this section, a motor vehicle constitutes any self-propelled
vehicle and includes, but is not limited to, any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle,
train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft.
(4) Automobile homicide is a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-207, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, §76-5-207; L 1974, ch. 32, §11;
1981, ch. 63, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 20.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1981 amendment added the second
sentence of subsec. (1); substituted "subsection 41-6-44(b)" in subsec. (2) for "section
41-6-44(b) of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act";
substituted "this section" in subsec. (3) for
"the automobile homicide section"; and made
a minor change in punctuation.

Repealing Clause.
Section 21 of Laws 1983, ch. 99 provided:
"Section 41-6-44.2, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as last amended by Chapter 4, Laws of
Utah 1982, Second Special Session, is
repealed."
Effective Date.
Section 22 of Laws 1983, ch. 99 provided:
"This act shall take effect August 1, 1983."
Law Reviews.
Utah Legislative Survey - 1981, 1982 Utah
L. Rev. 125, 139.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Criminal negligence required.
Criminal negligence, not simple negligence,
is required to support a conviction of automobile homicide under this section; criminal
negligence is defined by 76-2-103(4), and jury
must be instructed in accordance therewith.
State v. Chavez (1979) 605 P 2d 1226, overruling State v. Durrant (1977) 561 P 2d 1056,

State v. Anderson (1977) 561 P 2d 1061 and
State v. Wade (1977) 572 P 2d 398.
Where defendant's judgment upon conviction of charge of automobile homicide was
not final at time of State v. Chavez (1979) 605
P 2d 1226, ruling that conviction of such
charge required a finding of criminal negligence, defendant was entitled to claim benefit
of that ruling. State v. Belgard (1980) 615 P
2d 1274.
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41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or with high blood
alcohol content — Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Suspension or revocation of license, fa-) ( l j It is unlawful and punishable as provided
in subsection (4) of this section for any person with a blood alcohol content of .08%
or greater by weight, or who is under the influence of alcohol^ or who is tmder
the influence of any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a
degree which renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or
be in actual physical control of any a vehicle within this state. The fact that any
a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use
alcohol or a drug sh*M does not constitute a defense against any charge of violating
this section.
41-6-44

MOTOR VKIIICLKS

(&)—ht any criminal prosecution for a violation of subsection (a-) of this section
relating to driving a vehicle while under the influence -of alcohol, -or 4n -aity etv44
stttt or proceeding arising out of ttets alleged to have been committed by a«y person
while driving or m actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence
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the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question
wnetner or not tne person was under tne innuence or aiconoi;
(e) (2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
(d) (3) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of subsection
(1) of this section shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 60 days
nor more than six months, or by a fine of $299, or by both such fine and imprisonment; provided except that m if the event stteh person shall have has inflicted a
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated sakl the vehicle in a negligent manner, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the county
jail for not more than one year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of
not more than $1,000. For the purposes of this section, the standard of negligence
shall be is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care
which ordinarily reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances.
(e} (4) In addition to the penalties provided herein for in subsection (3), the
court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less
than two 48 consecutive hours nor more than 10 days with emphasis on serving
in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in *n alcohol rehabilitatien facility a community-service work program for not less than two nor more
than 10 days or and, in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the communityservice work program, order the person to obtain treatment at an participate m
an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(f) (5) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction under
this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance
with subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, in addition to the penalties provided
for in subsection (d) (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than two
15 consecutive hours nor more than 10 days with emphasis on serving in the drunk
tank of the jail, or require the person to work in an alcohol rehabilitation facility
a community-service work program for not less than 10 nor more than 30 days
Q* a n d, In addition to the ]*iil sentence or the work hi _the community-service work
program, order the person to participate In an assessment and educational series
at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility and the court may, in its discretion,
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. Upon a
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TRAFFIC RULES AND RECUSATIONS

41-6-44

9L under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted jn compliance with subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, Tn addition to the penalties provided for in subsection (d) (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 30 nor more than
90 days with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in «m alcohol rehabilitation facility a community-service work project
for not less than 30 nor more than 90 days pkts and, in addition to the jail sentence
or work in the community-service work program, order the person _to oBFain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. No portion of any sentence imposed pt*rsuant to under subsection (4) (3) shall be suspended nor shatt and the convicted
person shall not be eligible for parole or probation until such time as the any^ sentence providecTlfrf m this subsection imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or
a local ordinance similar to this section adoptecTln compliance with subsection
41-6-43 (1) shall not be terminated and the department shall not reinstate any
license suspended or revoked as a result "oT such conviction, if ~It~is a second or
subsequent such conviction witEin five years, until and unless tfie convicted person
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that~all fines and fees,
Including fees for restitution, and rehabilitation costs, assessed against the person,
have been paid.
(6) The provisions in subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing court to
order a convicted person to participate in an assessment and educational series ait
a licensed alcohol rehabnitation taciTity, ^obtain, in the discretion of the court,
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or "obtain,"mandatorily, treatment
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or do any combination of those things, apply
to a conviction for a violation of section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense
under subsectionT?), so as to require the court to render the same order regarding
education or treatment at an alcohol "rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection
with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under section 41-6-45 that qualifies
as a prior offense under subsection (7), as he would render m connection with
applying respectively, the "first, secondTor subsequent conviction requirements of
subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5). For purposes of determining whether a conviction
under section 41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under subsection (7),
is & first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction under either section 41-6-44 or 41-6-45 is deemed a prior conviction. Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-based or other education program
provided for in this section must be approved by the department of social services.
(g) (7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted pursuant to subsection 41-6-43(b) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of
a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis
for the plea, including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol or
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense.
The statement shall be an offer of proof of the facts which show whether or not
there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with the offense.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant prior to the acceptance of before
accepting the plea offered pursuant to under this subsection of the consequences
of a violation of section 41-6-45 as follows: If the court accepts the defendant's plea
of guilty or no contest to a charge of violating section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor
states for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, the resulting conviction shall be a prior offense for the purposes of paragraph {£) subsection (5) of
this section.
(c) The court shall notify the department of tnotor vehicles of each conviction
of section 41-6-45, which shall be a prior offense for the purposes of paragraph
(f) subsection (5) of this section.
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41-6-44.2

MOTOR VEHICLES

Ot) [8] A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation
of this section when tmeh the violation is coupled with an accident or collision in
which sttdt the person is involved and when stteh the violation has, in fact, been
committed, although not in his presence, if the officer has reasonable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by atteh the person.
ft) (9} The department of public safety shall revoke suspend for a period of 90
days tlie operator's or chauffeur^ iTcense of any person convicted~For the first Time
under subsection (1) of this section and shall revoke for one year tKe" license ^?
any person otherwise convicted underTTiTs section, except that the department may
subtract from any suspension period the number of dayslor which a license was
previously suspended under section 41-2-19.6 if the previous suspension was based
on the same occurrence which the record of conviction is basedlipon.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §34; C. 1943,
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, § 1;
1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, ch.
268, §3; 1979, ch. 243, §1; 1981, ch. 63, §2;
1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, ch.
103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33.
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1983, ch. 183, discontinuing separate
classification for chauffeur's license, is effective January 1,1984.
The 1982 amendment increased the minimum term in subsec. (d) from 30 to 60 days;
deleted "not less than $100 nor more than"
before "$299" in subsec. (d); inserted subsec.
(e); redesignated former subsec. (e) as (f);
increased the period of work from not less
than two nor more than 10 days to not less

than 10 nor more than 30 days in the first
sentence of subsec. (f); added "or to obtain
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility" to the first sentence of subsec. (f);
increased the periods in the second sentence
of subsec. (f) from not less than 10 nor more
than 30 days to not less than 30 nor more
than 90 days; added "plus obtain treatment
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility" to the
second sentence of subsec. (f); inserted
subsec. (g); redesignated former subsecs. (f)
and (g) as (h) and (ij.
Effective Date.
Section 2 of Laws 1982, ch. 46 provided
that the act should take effect upon approval.
Approved February 19, 1982.
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AUT1CLK 4
ACCIUKNTS
Laws 1983, ch. 183, discontinuing separate classification for chauffeur's license, is
effective January 1, 1984.
Section
.,
.
D
41-6-29. Driver's duty in event of accident - Stop at scene of accident - Penalty.
41-6-31. Give name — Render assistance.
41-6-29. Driver's duty in event of accident — Stop at scene of accident —
Penalty, (a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury
to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such
accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in
every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the
requirements of section 41-6-31. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing
traffic more than is necessary.
(b) Any person failing to stop or to comply with said requirements under such
circumstances shall upon conviction be punished by imprisonment in the county
jail for not less than thirty 30 days nor more than one year or by fine of not less
than $100 nor more than $5,000 or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(c) The department shall revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license of the person so convicted for a period not to exceed one year.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §19; C. 1943,
57-7-96; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 31.

41-6-30. Accidents involving damage to vehicle or other property
— Misdemeanor. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other property which is driven or
attended by any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene
of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall forthwith return
to and in every event shall remain at the scene of such accident until he
has fulfilled the requirements of section 41-6-31. Every such stop shall be
made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. Any person failing to stop or comply with said requirements under such circumstances
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §20; C. 1943, and substituted "an infraction" for "a misde57-7-97; L. 1977, ch. 269, § 1; 1979, ch. 242, § 6. meanor" at the end of the section.
T h e 1 9 7 9 amend
Compiler's Notes
ment substituted "a misderh* 1Q77 a M / j
. •
* ,, *.
.
meanor" for "an infraction" at the end of the
Ihe 1977 amendment inserted "or other section,
property" near the beginning of the section;

41-6-31. Give name — Render assistance. The driver of any vehicle involved
in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall give his name, address, and
the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and shall upon request and
if available exhibit his operator's or chauffeur's license to the person struck or the
driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle collided with and shall render
to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician,
surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such
treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injured person.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §21; C. 11M3,
57-7-98; L. 1983, ch. 183, § 32.
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41-6-34. Accidents involving injury, death, or damage of $400 or
more — Duty to notify police. The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or property damage to
an apparent extent of $400 or more, shall immediately by the quickest
means of communication give notice of such accident to the local police
department if such accident occurs within a municipality, otherwise to the
office of the county sheriff or to a state trooper.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §24; C. 1943,
The 1979 amendment increased the damage
57-7-101; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1977, ch. 269, § 3; amount from $200 to $400.
1979, ch. 242, § 7.
Cross-References.
Compiler's Notes.
Collision with unattended vehicle or other
The 1955 amendment inserted "or property property, 41-6-32.
damage to an apparent extent of $100 or
Failure to report accident, penalty,
more"; and substituted "state trooper" for 41-12-32.
"state highway patrolman."
False or forged reports, penalty, 41-12-32.
The 1977 amendment increased the damage
Notice given by occupant of vehicle,
amount from $100 to $200.
41-6-36.

41-6-43.10. Negligent homicide — Death occurring within one year — Penalty — Revocation of license or privilege to drive, ftt) (1} When the death of
any person ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury received by the
driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the person so
operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide.
(b) (2) Any person convicted of negligent homicide shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or by fine of not less than
$100 nor more than $1,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(e) [3] The department shall revoke the license or permit to drive and any nonresident operating privilege of any person convicted of negligent homicide*
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43.10, enacted by L.
1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch.
99, § 12.
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AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of W a r or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions, Hie accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein Hie crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.

A R T . T, 5 1 2

CONSTITUTION OP UTAII

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by Hie witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. ]n no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
Hie rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for Hie same offense.
Comparable Provision.
Montitna Const., Art. I l l , § 1G.

— acquittal n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g defect in information or indictment, 77-24-12.
—acquittal or dismissal without judgCross-References.
ment, 77-24-11.
Defendant as witness, 77-44-5.
—;i<-ts punishable in different ways,
Double
jeopardy,
s
t
a
t
u
t
o
r
y
provision,
punishment
to one,
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77-1-6. Rights of defendant, (1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
PKKIJMINAKY PROVISIONS

77-1-6

(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses
n his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor
a husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon
a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial
by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by
a magistrate.
History: C. 1953, 77-1-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, §2.
Cross-References.
Actions without payment of fees by
impecunious suitors, 21-7-2 to 21-7-4.
Arrest of judgment, effect on further prosecution, 77-35-23.
Attorneys, rights in disbarment proceedings, 78-51-16.
Constitutional rights of accused, Const.
Art. I, §§7-13.
Counsel for indigents, 77-32-1 et seq.
Criminal Code provisions on multiple prosecutions and double jeopardy, 76-1 -401 et seq.
Discharge of defendant turned state's witness, 77-17-2.
Discharge of defendant upon compromise
of offense as barring further prosecution,
77-35-25.
Due process of law, Const. Art. I, § 7.
Errors and defects not affecting substantial rights disregarded, 77-35-30.
Husband and wife, marital privilege as to
confidential communications, Rules of Evidence, Rule 28.
Husband or wife not competent witness
against or for each other without consent,
exceptions, 78-24-8.
Jury trial and waiver thereof, Const. Art. I,
§ 10; 77-35-17.

Lineup procedures, 77-8-1 et seq.
Ordinance violation cases, jeopardy in,
10-7-65.
Proceedings when facts charged do not
constitute an offense, 77-35-17.
Self-incrimination, Rules of Evidence,
Rules 24, 25.
Subpoena for witnesses for impecunious
defendant in criminal case, 21-5-14.
Witness unable to procure bond, examination, 77-35-7.
Appearance at trial in prison clothing.
Defendant has a constitutional right not to
appear in identifiable prison clothing at trial;
this does not require state to provide defendant with an expensive wardrobe, but state
should provide clean, respectable clothes, not
identifiable as prison clothes, for defendant
at trial. Chess v. Smith (1980) 617 P 2d 341.
Waiver of right not to stand trial in prison
clothes.
Trial judge should on his own initiative
inquire of a defendant whether he wishes to
waive his right not to appear in prison
clothes so that the record affirmatively shows
an intelligent and conscious waiver by the
defendant if he chooses to stand trial in
prison clothes. Chess v. Smith (1980) 617 P 2d
341.
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77-35-17. Rule 17 — The trial, (a) In all cases the defendant shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial with the following exceptions:
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may
consent in writing to trial in his absence;
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time
for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been
present; and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good
cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal
attendance of the defendant at the trial
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following
order:
(1) Misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody;

UTAH RULB:S OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

77-35-17

(2) Felony cases when defendant is in custody;
(3) Felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and
(4) Misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance.
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives
a jury in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of
the prosecution.
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant
makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders
otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction.
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in section 78-46-5.
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of
the accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or
made orally in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in
progress with any number of jurors less than otherwise required.
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the following order:
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated;
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution
has rested;
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge;
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case;
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the
court, for good cause, otherwise permits;
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time,
the court shall instruct the jury; and
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both
sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the
defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the
defense argument. The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument
of counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for argument.
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an
alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate
juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proby the
Howard W.ofHunter
Law Library,
J. ReubenOtherwise,
Clark Law School,
ceed Digitized
with the
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jurors
remaining.
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jury shall be
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discharged and a new trial ordered.

(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view
the place in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in
which any other material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted
in a body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown
to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer
shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no
person other than the person so appointed to speak to them nor to do so
himself on any subject connected with the trial and to return them into,
court without unnecessary delay or at a specified time.
77-35-17

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it
is their duty not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the
trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon
until the case is finally submitted to them.
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the
instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have been
received as evidence, except depositions; and each juror may also take with
him any notes of the testimony or other proceedings taken by himself, but
none taken by any other person.
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the
court. Except by order of the court, the officer having them under his
charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make
any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict,
and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person
the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the
officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court.
The court may then direct that the jury be brought before the court where,
in the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond
to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given.
Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond
to the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court,
in which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the
record.
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may
be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may
be sent out again.
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all of the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any
information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the
evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein
or any lesser included offense.
History: C. 1953, 77-35-17, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 14, § 1; L. 1981, ch. 60, § 1; 1982, ch.
11, § 1.

misdemeanor cases the jury shall consist of
eight persons; and in all other misdemeanor
cases the jury shall consist of four persons.
The court may order the selection of altern a t e j u r o r 3 [n a n y ca ae."

Compiler's Notes.
The 1981 amendment changed the time for
requesting a jury trial from five to ten days Cross-References.
prior
to trialbyinthesubsec.
Capital
penalty,
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Circuit court trials for ordinance viola-

